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Selected Issues in TPP Negotiations and 
Implications for China
Henry Gao*
I From the P4 to the TPP
The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement is also known as 
the Pacific-4, or the P4 Agreement as it started out as a free trade agreement 
between 4 Pacific countries, i.e., Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore.1 
The history of economic integration among the P4 members can be traced 
back to the 1990s, when Chile and New Zealand first started exploring the pos-
sibility for an FTA.2 While the bilateral talks were suspended after only two 
rounds of negotiations due to Chile’s concerns on the potential impact on its 
agricultural sector, the idea re-emerged in 2000, shortly after New Zealand and 
Singapore announced the negotiation of an FTA. This time it took the form of 
a trilateral Closer Economic Partnership (CEP) involving all three countries. 
Originally conceptualized as the “Pacific Three” (P3) Agreement, its propo-
nents also hoped that the Agreement could pave the way for wider trade liber-
alization in the APEC region that would lead to a P5 scheme, i.e., Australia and 
the US in addition to the original three countries.
After the CEP between New Zealand and Singapore entered into force in 
2001, the three countries re-assessed the likelihood of different alternatives 
and decided that the time might not be ripe for the P5 as neither the US nor 
Australia was keen. Instead, the parties should try to get the P3 off the ground 
first. In 2002, the P3 negotiation was re-launched during the APEC leader’s 
meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico. From 2003 to 2005, five rounds of negotiations 
were held. Brunei participated in the negotiations as an observer from the 
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 second round, and then requested to join as a formal member just before the 
final round of negotiations in April 2005. On 3 June 2005, the parties announced 
the successful conclusion of the negotiations at the APEC meeting in Jeju, 
Korea. The Agreement entered into force in 2006.
II A Unique Agreement
Compared with most other FTAs in Asia, the TPP has several unique features:
First, the memberships of the other FTAs are mostly restricted to the 
Members in Asia. In contrast, from the very beginning, the TPP is a trans-
regional agreement that spans across three continents, i.e., Asia (Singapore 
and Brunei), Oceania (NZ) and Americas (Chile).
Second, other FTAs are mostly sponsored by a big Power (such as the US or 
China) or a Regional group (such as ASEAN or EU), but the TPP was initiated 
by three smaller countries which, according to most common benchmarks 
such as land mass, population, and GDP, are at best middle Powers.
Third, most other FTAs are rather exclusive and automatically close their 
doors after the initial agreement is signed. If any other country wishes to join 
the FTA, it has to first persuade all existing members to accept it, which is not 
an easy task. In contrast, the TPP was negotiated with an “open-accession” 
clause that allows “any APEC economy or other state” to seek accession 
(Article 20.6).
Fourth, while many FTAs have been criticized in one way or the other, the 
TPP has been widely hailed as a “high standard” agreement since the very 
beginning.3 In a previous article, I argued that this claim is largely a myth.4 For 
example, in terms of the tariff reduction, the TPP only offer negligible benefits 
due to the low pre-FTA tariffs and small bilateral trade volumes. Why, then, did 
the parties negotiate the Agreement in the first place?
The answer was provided by Juan Salazar, the Chilean Ambassador to New 
Zealand, who argued that “the initiative was, from the very beginning, not sup-
posed to be a typical Free Trade Agreement (FTA)” that aims at “increasing 
bilateral flows of merchandise.”5 Instead, the parties really wanted to use the 
Agreement to build “a larger scheme for a Closer Economic Partnership (CEP)” 
with the following goals:
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(a) use the Agreement as a benchmark for trade liberalization among APEC 
economies and create a demonstration effect for the WTO;
(b) use the Agreement to promote political cooperation between countries 
with similar political philosophies; and
(c) use the Agreement to forge potential strategic alliance on a wide array of 
areas ranging from agricultural, education to technology.6
Of the three objectives, the first one is most relevant from the perspective of 
trade policy and worth further discussion. As small, open and export-oriented 
economies, the P4 countries are highly dependent on trade. Thus, they have to 
push harder for world trade liberalization than their larger and less export-
dependent trade partners. When multilateral negotiations don’t move forward, 
they will have to resort to bilateral or regional initiatives to create more market 
access opportunities for their exports and eventually increase the momentum 
for trade liberalization on the wider platform. While the P4 countries them-
selves might not have sufficient political clout to move negotiations at the 
WTO, the initiative could serve as a stepping-stone for an expanded “Px” agree-
ment within APEC. Indeed, as we discussed in the previous part, one of the 
explicit objectives of the original P3 initiative was to entice the US and Australia 
joining the Agreement.
III The TPP and the US
Given the small sizes of the original P4 economies, it seems rather puzzling 
that the US would pay any attention to such an agreement. What is so special 
about the P4 Agreement? What is in it for the US? In the view of the author, the 
main benefits to the US for joining the TPP are the following:
First, the Agreement can help the US to continue its presence and engage-
ment in the Asia Pacific region. While Asia is a latecomer in regional integra-
tion compared to Europe and the Americas, the progress of regionalization has 
intensified during the past decade. The US has managed to score FTAs with 
Australia, Singapore and Korea, but so far the US has largely been left out in the 
integration efforts in the region. Indeed, as noted by an official USTR docu-
ment, other than the three FTAs signed by the US, there are now 175 FTAs 
involving Asia-Pacific countries, with more than 70 other agreements in the 
pipeline, all excluding the US.7 Moreover, in the grand scheme of things, Asia 
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Pacific countries seem to grow accustomed to working without the US. Before 
the US launched the TPP negotiations in 2010, there were five competing mod-
els for region-wide integration in Asia Pacific: “ASEAN plus Three,” i.e., the ten 
ASEAN countries plus China, Japan and Korea; “ASEAN plus Six,” i.e., India, 
Australia and New Zealand on top of the countries in the first model; the East 
Asia Community (EAC) backed by Japan;8 the Free Trade Area of the Asia-
Pacific (FTAAP);9 and the Australian proposal for an Asia-Pacific Community 
(APc).10 Among them, the first two definitely exclude the US. As to the EAC, 
while Japan has never made clear the exact nature of its membership, it seems 
rather absurd if anyone were to argue that the US be considered as an East 
Asian country. For the APc, while Australia has not predefined the potential 
members, it seems reasonable to presume that the US would be included given 
the strong US-Australia alliance and the inclusion of the word “Pacific” in its 
title. Similarly, the FTAAP most likely would include the US as well. In sum-
mary, among the five models of regional integration in Asia pre-2010, only two 
would involve the US. The additional problem is that these two, i.e., the APc 
and the FTAAP, are also the least attractive: given the extremely large and 
diverse membership of the two models, it is almost impossible for either model 
to lead to legally binding agreements. In contrast, the TPP Agreement provides 
the perfect vehicle for the US to cherry-pick those Asian countries which are 
not only economically meaningful but also strategically important to the US 
and conclude Agreement with them.
Second, the Agreement can help the US to achieve important strategic 
objectives. As argued eloquently by Fred Bergsten and Jeffrey Schott in their 
submission to the USTR in support of the TPP Agreement on behalf of the 
Peterson Institute for International Economics:
Since the beginning of APEC in 1989, many Asian countries have strongly 
advocated US involvement in the organization in order to ensure contin-
ued US economic and military engagement in the region as a balance 
against Chinese hegemony. Former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of 
Singapore, on a visit to Washington in late 2009, warned of the risk of 
increasing Chinese dominance over its Asian neighbors—and decreas-
ing US relevance—should the United States fail to engage economically 
and politically in the region. Japan, Korea, and the ASEAN countries all 
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seek to maintain active US engagement as a “hedging strategy” against 
the rise of China. Economic tensions between the United States and 
China, and the increased risks of Asia-Pacific disintegration due to the 
advent of Asia-only economic arrangements, underline the need for 
effective transpacific linkages and institutional ties for security as well as 
economic reasons.11
In short, the P4 Agreement would help the US to maintain its security ties in 
the region through enhanced integration with economies in the region.
Third, negotiations on the TPP Agreement could also provide the US with 
the testing ground for different types of trade agreements. While the Bush 
Administration has already been criticized by many developing countries for 
trying to force the US model on its FTA partners, one can still argue that the 
topics the US demanded in FTAs, such as investment, services liberalization, 
government procurement, and intellectual property rights protection, are 
trade issues. In contrast, the Obama Administration seems to be taking an 
even more radical view on what FTAs are about. In a speech he made in 
December 2009, USTR Ron Kirk summed up the new approach as “a true 21st 
century trade agreement” that “will reflect U.S. priorities and values, enhance 
American competitiveness, and generate job-creating opportunities for 
American businesses and workers.” While this might sound rather ambiguous, 
Kirk provided some hints on the new strategy in his letter to the Congress on 
the TPP Agreement by noting that the US will try to negotiate additional com-
mitments on “environmental protection and conservation, transparency, 
workers’ rights and protections, and development.” As the first major trade 
agreement ever seriously negotiated by the Obama Administration, the TPP 
Agreement is very likely to have major implications on the future direction of 
the US FTA policy or even overall trade policy.
Fourth, the economic potential of the TPP is also quite substantial. While 
the US is no longer in recession, the pace of recovery has been much slower 
than expected. Unlike China, which can stimulate growth by encouraging 
more domestic consumption, the US economy has long suffered from over-
consumption and low savings rate. Thus, increasing export is the only realistic 
way to help the US speed up the recovery. That’s why Obama launched the 
National Export Initiative in 2010 to double the US export in five years.12 
This  target cannot be achieved without engaging the Asian Pacific region, 
which accounts for 60% of the US exports. While the total US exports to the 
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P4 countries is only 5% of its worldwide exports, the TPP will be a much bigger 
game if other countries in the region also join in.
Although initially sceptical, the US became interested and joined the talks 
when the P4 countries began work on the outstanding chapters on Financial 
Services and Investment in March 2008.13 Building on this work, the US also 
started to seriously explore the possibility of joining the entire agreement.14 
On September 22, 2008, the USTR announced the launch of the negotiations 
for the US to accede to the P4 Agreement.15 The first round of negotiations was 
originally scheduled in March 2009, but this was put on hold due to the change 
of administration in early 2009. On November 14, 2009, Obama finally 
announced in Tokyo that the US was ready to start the formal negotiations.16 
The first round of negotiations was held from March 15 to 19, 2010 in Melbourne, 
Australia. In addition to the US and the original P4 countries, Australia, Peru 
and Viet Nam also joined at the negotiating table.17 After two more rounds in 
San Francisco and Brunei, New Zealand hosted the fourth round in Oakland 
with Malaysia being welcomed into the negotiations. In 2012, Mexico and 
Canada also joined the negotiations. At the 18th Round in July 2013, Japan 
became the newest member.18 In addition to these twelve countries, Korea,19 
Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Taiwan have all expressed interest in 
joining the Agreement at some point.
IV Negotiation Process: High Standard Meets Low Politics
In an article published in 2012, I discussed both the architectural and substan-
tive issues of the TPP negotiations.20 As the negotiations were still in early 
stages at that time, I made some predictions and suggestions on how the 
negotiations should be conducted if the US is indeed serious about conclud-
ing a “high-standard” agreement. Some of these predictions turned out to be 
correct. For example, I argued that, as the P4 itself carried some birth defects, 
it should not be simply transplanted into the new TPP agreement.21 Instead, 
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the US should use this opportunity to transform the P4 Agreement into some-
thing better. This was indeed the approach taken, as is shown by the Outlines 
of TPP Agreement, which goes well beyond the framework of the old P4 
Agreement.22 On the other hand, some of my suggestions didn’t go down well 
with the negotiators. Instead, judging from the progress of the negotiation so 
far, it appears that the lofty goal of “high standard” has once again become a 
victim of low politics. In this Section, I will briefly discuss the negotiating 
 process on some of the main issues. Due to space constraint, I will focus on 
five issues, i.e., market access on goods, rules of origin, trade in services, 
 investor-state dispute settlement, disciplines on state-owned enterprises, and 
environmental provisions.
A Market Access on Goods
The US initially preferred to conduct market access negotiations on two differ-
ent tracks:23 First, for those countries that already have FTAs with the US, the 
US simply maintains the tariff schedules in the existing FTAs.24 This way, the 
existing schedules will not be re-opened, and the US may maintain its protec-
tion on sensitive products excluded from previous FTAs, such as sugar prod-
ucts in its FTA with Australia.25 Second, bilateral negotiations will be held 
among parties without existing FTAs. However, this is likely to result in the 
same product being subject to different tariff rates depending on its country of 
origin. Thus, the more liberal countries such as Australia, New Zealand and 
Singapore have been pushing for plurilateral negotiations between all TPP 
members to establish a single, unified tariff schedule among all members.26 In 
September 2010, the members agreed to adopt a hybrid approach, whereby 
each member may decide whether to make its tariff reduction offers on a bilat-
eral or multilateral basis.27 In late 2011, the members further agreed that the 
tariff schedule will cover all goods, representing some 11,000 tariff lines.28 The 
latest text indicates that the market access package will provide “comprehen-
sive, duty-free” access to most of the goods, with some sensitive products as 
exceptions.29
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B Rules of Origin (ROO)
The goal of the ROO negotiations is to “develop trade-facilitating rules of ori-
gin that encourage accumulation across the region, which will promote pro-
duction and supply chains between the TPP countries and make it much 
easier for businesses, both large and small, to take advantage of the agree-
ment.” At the start of negotiations, rules of origin appeared to be a difficult 
issue as the US has a history of adopting rather restrictive and complex ROOs 
in its previous FTAs.30 While the members have been able to agree “on a sig-
nificant share of these rules,”31 problems would still remain in several sectors. 
For example, the US textile industry has lobbied for the inclusion of a yarn-
forwarding rule for textile imports, which requires all components of an 
apparel item, starting with the yarn, to originate in TPP countries to qualify 
for the lower tariff under the TPP.32 This means that TPP countries like 
Vietnam will greatly reduce or even stop importing fabrics from non-TPP 
countries like China. Of course, this will also increase the price of apparel 
imports due to the higher production costs for fabrics in TPP countries. To 
appease the US apparel retailers and importers who might be affected by this, 
the US also proposed a short-supply list, which allows the usage of non-TPP 
fabrics in certain items that are deemed to be in “short supply” among TPP 
countries. This creates a partial exception to the yard-forwarding rule and the 
list current includes 215 items.33
C Trade in Services
The services negotiation in the TPP is conducted on a “negative-list” basis, 
which means that all sectors and modes of supply must be liberalized unless 
non-conforming measures are noted in a particular sector or mode.34 This is 
the preferred approach by the US in its FTAs as it usually results in more mar-
ket access opportunities than the traditional GATS-type “positive-list” 
approach, where no commitment is undertaken on a sector or mode unless it 
is been specifically included in the schedule of specific commitments.35
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As the negative list approach is new to several TPP members such as Malaysia 
and Vietnam,36 there were some difficulties in the negotiations at first as they 
were over-cautious37 and tried to carve out the “entire universe.”38 However, 
with the technical assistance provided by the US, they gradually overcame the 
fear of the negative-list approach and the negotiations moved on.39
Notwithstanding the progress made, problems still remain in individual 
sectors. For example, Malaysia maintains caps on foreign equity in sectors such 
as financial services, insurance, telecommunications and retail, where the US 
has keen interests.40 The US is reluctant to open the maritime services sector, 
as the Jones Act requires that cargo transportation between US ports must be 
provided by US-flagged vessels.41 Singapore is against a US proposal to restrict 
the ability of countries to impose capital controls in case of financial crisis.42 
Japan has problems in the postal services and insurance sectors, which are 
dominated by state-owned Japan Post.43 Given these problems, while the 
members have improved their offers in the past year, they still have some way 
to go before they can achieve the aim of a “high-standard” outcome in the 
 services area.44
D Investor-state Dispute Settlement
The controversy over investor-state dispute settlement mechanism in the TPP 
is relatively well-known, with the US pushing for its incorporation while 
Australia and New Zealand seeking its exclusion.45 Their opposition to the 
mechanism largely stems from the fear that foreign investors might use the 
mechanism to limit the policy space available to the government on various 
issues, as illustrated by the recent challenge brought by Philip Morris under 
the Australia-Hong Kong Bilateral Investment Treaty46 against the plain 
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 packaging requirement imposed by the Australian government.47 However, 
with the change of government in late 2013, Australia appears to be ready to 
take a more flexible approach on the issue, especially if the US can offer addi-
tional market access for Australian exports.48 In the end, the mechanism will 
probably be incorporated in the final agreement.
However, its scope of coverage might not be extensive as the US has hoped, 
as several members have resisted US proposal to cover disputes over the fulfil-
ment of obligations to provide most favoured nation treatment, national treat-
ment and the minimum standard of treatment to investments in the financial 
services sector.49 This is opposed not only by close US allies like Canada, but 
also by domestic US financial regulators such as the Treasury Department, 
Federal Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission, which tried to 
shield themselves from such challenges.50 Similarly, the US proposal to have 
the mechanism cover public concession contracts granted by the government 
to private firms on either public services or infrastructure projects also faces 
challenges from negotiating partners.51
E Disciplines on State-owned Enterprises
Another controversial issue is the disciplines on SOEs, which started out with 
several countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei opposing it, 
while the two main supporters, the US and Australia, tabling conflicting pro-
posals.52 The Australian proposal incorporates its domestic “competitive neu-
trality” rules, under which state-owned firms essentially reimburse the national 
government for any advantages they receive by virtue of their government 
ownership.53 In contrast, the US prefers imposing transparency requirements 
as well as disciplines to ensure that SOEs do not receive advantages that distort 
their competition with private firms in commercial markets.54
In July 2013, Australia and the US finally agreed to a consolidated text that 
highlights the similarities and differences between their two proposals.55 
Meanwhile, Vietnam also shows willingness to soften its position in exchange 
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for adequate concessions from the US on apparel and footwear products, as it 
is trying to reform its SOEs anyway.56
However, its two ASEAN friends are still holding out. Singapore is concerned 
with overly-intrusive transparency requirements which could affect the opera-
tion of its SOEs, as well as rules that would scrutinize even firms with only 
partial ownership by its state-owned investment firm Tamasek Holdings.57 On 
the other hand, Malaysia is concerned with the impact of the disciplines on 
the role of SOEs regarding “provision of public goods and services, develop-
ment of strategic industries and implementation of socio-development pro-
grammes.”58 It tries to seek flexibilities that would allow the continued 
existence of such firms to provide public and social goods and services.59 In 
contrast, while Japan is also concerned with the impact of the SOE rules on its 
SOEs such as Japan Tobacco, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, and Japan Post, 
it might be willing to offer concessions if other countries make “fair” conces-
sions in exchange, especially in the financial services sector.60
In the end, while some kind of rules on SOEs could be incorporated into the 
TPP, it probably would also be subject to country-specific exceptions.
F Environment, Labour and Human Rights Issues
Along with market access, IPR and SOEs, environment has been identified by 
US trade officials as one of the four most difficult areas in the negotiations.61 
Labour is also a thorny issue for the US due to resistances from both some TPP 
partners as well as domestic constituencies.62 As I mentioned in my 2012 arti-
cle, there are many issues regarding the inclusion of non-traditional trade 
issues such as environment, labour and human rights:63
The first issue relate to the format of the agreements: should issues such as 
environment, labour and human rights be incorporated as chapters in the 
main agreement or as side deals annexed to the main agreement? In the P4 
Agreement, these issues did not find their way into the main agreement. 
Instead, cooperation on environmental protection was included as a side 
agreement, with labour as a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). In 
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 contrast, the US FTAs with Australia, Chile, Peru and Singapore all included 
environment and labour as chapters in the main agreement. This is in line with 
the position taken in the May 2007 Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy64 
and the “Trade Reform, Accountability, Development, and Employment 
(TRADE) Act” Bill, which reflect the US positions on these issues.65 Thus, it is 
very likely that environment and labour will be incorporated as formal chap-
ters in the agreement rather than side agreements. As to human rights, even 
though the TRADE Act also calls for its incorporation into the core agreement, 
the Bipartisan Agreement is silent on the issue. Moreover, other than labour 
rights, human rights are not featured in the existing US FTAs either. Thus, it is 
unlikely to be included as a formal chapter.
The second issue is the choice of language for the new issues: should the 
provisions contain only soft, non-binding language, or formal, legally-enforce-
able language? In the P4 agreement, the side agreements use only best-endeav-
our languages that do not really create legally binding obligations. Moreover, 
the side agreements explicitly recognize the parties have “sovereign rights to 
set their own policies and national priorities and to set, administer and enforce 
their own laws and regulations” on the subject. In contrast, much stronger lan-
guage was used in the more recent US FTAs, where the best-endeavour lan-
guage of “strive to” was replaced with “shall.” As this is a demand in both the 
Bipartisan Agreement and the TRADE Act, we will probably find rather formal 
language that is legally enforceable in the new TPP Agreement.
The third issue is how detailed the obligation shall be: shall the obligation 
only refer to adherence to general international standards or shall references 
be made to specific international instruments? With regard to environment, 
the P4 agreement only refers vaguely to the “respective multilateral environ-
ment commitments” of the members but never made clear as to which specific 
multilateral environment agreements (MEAs) are included in these commit-
ments. In contrast, the US FTAs explicitly refers to a specific list of seven MEAs 
covering matters such as endangered species, ozone layer, whaling, etc. As to 
labour, while the P4 agreement refers to “the principles of the ILO Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up (1998),” the 
US FTAs goes one step further by explicitly listing the principles in its FTAs, i.e., 
freedom of association, right to collective bargaining, elimination of forced 
labour, abolition of child labour, and discrimination on employment and occu-
pation. On these two issues, given the strong interest of the US on these issues 
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as evidenced in the Bipartisan Agreement and the TRADE Act, it’s very likely 
that the new TPP agreement will follow the US approach.
The fourth issue is how to incorporate the obligations into the domestic 
legal regime. The P4 Agreement only includes vague language for the members 
to ensure that their relevant “laws, regulations, policies and practices in har-
mony with its international commitments.” This falls short of requiring the 
members to adopt the international standard, as harmonization can be 
achieved through adoption of similar but not identical standards. In contrast, 
the US FTAs explicitly requires that the relevant international standards, such 
as the five core ILO principles, to be adopted and maintained in the laws and 
regulations of the trade partner.66 Failure to do so is regarded as violation of a 
legal obligation. Again, the US position is confirmed by the Bipartisan 
Agreement and the TRADE Act and this is likely to be reflected into the new 
TPP agreement.
The next issue is the enforcement of these obligations. The P4 agreement 
chooses the least intrusive approach by leaving it to each member to “set, 
administer and enforce its own laws, regulations and policies according to its 
priorities.” Any relaxation or failure to enforce such laws is only deemed as 
“inappropriate” rather than “illegal.” In contrast, enforcement failures are 
grounds for violation claims under the US FTAs. Of course, there are two 
important pre-conditions for the claim: First, the failure must be demonstrated 
“through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction.” In other words, 
a few isolated incidents of failure will not be sufficient as the ground for a vio-
lation claim. Second, the failure must occur “in a manner affecting trade or 
investment.” While both elements are affirmed by the Bipartisan agreement, 
the TRADE Act takes a bolder position and removes both conditions. In my 
view, even the milder version of the US position is hard to swallow for some 
TPP members, such as Vietnam or Malaysia. The problem is not so much with 
the first condition, as countries with inadequate regulatory and enforcement 
framework on labour and environment issues are guaranteed to have “sus-
tained or recurring” failures. Instead, it is the second condition that’s going to 
be problematic. Interpreted broadly, “in a manner affecting trade or invest-
ment” can be taken to include any enforcement failures. For example, even 
enforcement failures that affect only domestic producers or domestic markets 
of one country can be argued to have an impact on the competitiveness of the 
imports from the FTA partners into the domestic market of the first country. In 
my view, unless the US is willing to back off slightly and settle with language 
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such as “directly affecting trade or investment” the other members might not 
be willing to accept such an obligation.
The last issue is regarding dispute settlement. As the P4 agreement does not 
create legally binding obligations, there is no formal dispute settlement mech-
anism regarding these issues in the agreement. Instead, the only recourse a 
party has it to hold bilateral consultation with the other trade partner or refer 
the matter for discussion before the FTA Commission. In contrast, the US FTAs 
explicitly provides for the use of the same dispute settlement mechanism as 
regarding the trade obligations. Moreover, trade sanctions can be imposed for 
violations. While this arrangement is also confirmed by the Bipartisan 
Agreement and the TRADE Act, I’m not sure this will go down well with the 
other TPP members. In all likelihood, there will be strong resistance from 
countries such as Vietnam or Malaysia. Whether or not they will agree to the 
provision in the end will depend on a lot of factors, including the value of the 
market access concessions they can get from the US.
Indeed, most of these issues turned out to be controversial in the negotia-
tions, with different countries having problems with different parts of the 
U.S. proposal.67
V The China Question
As the TPP keeps snowballing to include more and more Asia Pacific econo-
mies, it seems rather puzzling that China, one of the most important econo-
mies in the region, has so far been absent. The preferred explanation among 
Chinese commentators is that the exclusion of China is deliberate as the US 
wants to use the TPP to contain China. For a long time, the US government has 
been denying this theory. However, at the height of the election campaign in 
2012, Obama finally admitted this, by noting that “we’re organizing trade rela-
tions with countries other than China so that China starts feeling more pressure 
about meeting basic international standards” (emphases added).68 In October 
2013, Obama further confirmed that the exclusion of China from TPP is for 
strategic reasons by stating that “[i]f we can get a trade deal with all the other 
countries in Asia […] that’ll help us in our negotiations with China.”69
On the other hand, Western commentators tend to believe that China was 
not interested in the TPP as it was not ready to meet the high-standards. 
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However, China’s position seems to be changing. Earlier last year, the Ministry 
of Commerce stated that it is evaluating the pros and cons of joining the 
TPP, and this is widely interpreted as an indication of its interest in joining 
the TPP.70
Whether China likes it or not, the TPP is already there and seems likely to be 
concluded within the next two years, if not longer. How should China deal with 
the TPP? Strategically speaking, there are three possible options for China.
The first option is totally ignoring the TPP. This seemed to be the approach 
taken by China for the first two years after the launch of the TPP negotiations. 
It made sense as it is consistent with China’s traditional approach on FTAs. As 
I mentioned in an earlier article,71 China’s RTAs tend to have a narrower cover-
age than those negotiated by other major players, such as the USA, EU or 
Japan. Normally, China would start with an agreement that covers trade in 
goods only and would expand to services only after commitments on goods 
have been substantially implemented. With regard to the issues that are not 
traditionally trade-related, such as environmental protection, competition 
policy and labour standards, China has been reluctant to include them as part 
of the FTA package, though recently it has shown some willingness to incorpo-
rate them. Nonetheless, in line with its cautious approach, China has largely 
preferred to address these in standalone side agreements or MOUs, rather 
than through FTAs.
However, burying its head in the sand is the worst possible option for China. 
The reason is simple: the US will not only use the TPP to enhance its economic 
ties with Asia Pacific countries, but also make rules on key issues such as SOEs, 
e-commerce, government procurement, etc. without the involvement by 
China. Once these rules are set, the US is likely to push for their global accep-
tance in the WTO, and it would be hard for China to resist them given the 
support by TPP members.
The second option is trying to join the TPP as soon as possible. As stated by 
the Mexican Economy Secretary Bruno Ferrari when Mexico applied to join 
the TPP in late 2011, “the most important part is to participate in designing the 
rules of the TPP, not just enter into the TPP.”72 By entering the TPP negotia-
tions, China could play some role in designing the new rules. However, the US 
probably will not want China’s participation before the conclusion of the 
negotiations as it would make it more difficult for the US to control the direc-
tion of the negotiations. Moreover, even if China manages to get in, it has to 
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face procedural hurdles in the accession process. While there are no explicit 
rules on accession, the experience of other countries which have joined the 
TPP negotiations half-way suggested that the following are the likely steps for 
new applicants:73
First, in terms of the process, the applicant has to consult with current TPP 
members on a bilateral basis, in addition to meeting in parallel with TPP mem-
bers as a group.74
Second, in terms of the substance, the country has to demonstrate that it 
can “live up to the high standards of the TPP agreement”75 by addressing issues 
of concern for all TPP members, and must be willing to make concessions in 
specific areas of interests.76 For example, when Japan applied, it was asked to 
provide better access for U.S. agricultural exports such as beef, market access 
for autos, pharmaceuticals and medical devices, as well as insurance services.77 
Also, the new member has to accept everything that has been agreed by exist-
ing members in the new negotiations and may not re-open any concluded 
issue for discussion.78
Third, to admit a new member, the existing members have to reach a con-
sensus decision. Of course, for obvious reasons, the view of the US is the most 
important.79
Fourth, before being admitted as a full member, an applicant may start out 
as an “associate member.” As such, the applicant may observe three rounds of 
negotiations without having to assume all the responsibilities of the full mem-
bers. However, it must commit to full participation by the time of the fourth 
round.
Given the complicated accession process, again China could be subject to 
high demands from the existing members, especially the US. Thus, this is not 
an attractive option for China either.
The third option is trying to make its own set of rules in its existing and new 
FTAs. In my view, this is the best option for China as it can prevent the domi-
nance of the US approach. The difficulty, however, is that China’s capacity in 
rule-making seems to be lacking. As I discussed in another article, even in the 
Doha Round where the negotiations mainly focus on traditional trade issues, 
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China has not been able to introduce many meaningful new rules.80 While 
China has made more than 100 submissions as of July 2008,81 most of its pro-
posals focuses on either the procedural issues or the special and differential 
treatment for developing countries and do not touch on the substance of the 
negotiation. Similarly, if we take a look at China’s existing FTAs, we can see that 
China hasn’t really used them to make new rules either. The only exception is 
the recognition of its status as a market economy, which China has demanded 
as a sine qua non from every negotiating partner.82 The reason for this is that, 
as the price for its WTO accession, China has agreed to be treated as a non-
market economy.83 This makes it easier for other countries to find the exis-
tence of dumping in anti-dumping investigations against China. Given the 
structural problems in the WTO decision-making process, it is difficult for 
China to change its non-market economy status in the multilateral trading sys-
tem. The remaining option is for China to negotiate with each of its trade part-
ners to recognize China’s market economy status. Because it has much more 
bargaining power at the bilateral/regional level, this strategy seems to be work-
ing. As of the end of 2011, 81 economies have recognized the market economy 
status of China.84
Thus, it seems even more unlikely that China could come up a different set 
of rules on the issues covered by the TPP, many of which are cutting-edge 
issues. To solve the problem, China could consider seeking help from scholars 
and think-tanks, especially those based overseas who have studied the various 
issues for a long time. Moreover, China may also wish to use the Shanghai Free 
Trade Zone as a testing ground for new ideas before they can be committed to 
at the national level.
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